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Churchill: The Glimmer of Hope in Britain's Dark Days 
By Jaime Konieczny ‘07
When World War II broke out in 1939,Winston Churchill was not the British 
Prime Minister. However, he had been a Member of Parliament for forty years and as the 
war steadily increased in intensity his tenacious leadership inspired the country to elect 
him as Prime Minister by May o f 1940. It has been said that he was one of the greatest 
leaders in the 20th century because of his inspiration, aggressive leadership and refusal to 
surrender. Along with his dynamic spirit, Churchill’s creation and appointment of the 
position Minister of Defense in 1940 was crucial for Britain’s perseverance during the 
darkest time of World War II (June 1940-41). Through the establishment of this position 
and his own personal knowledge Churchill was able to effectively direct and control the 
war effort and create an atmosphere of hope in an uncertain time for the British people, 
which ultimately lead to their victory in the war.
Churchill created the position of Minister of Defense primarily because of his 
previous concerns about the lack of effective administrative organization and control of 
wartime activities. He feared the lack of centralized information and decision-making. 
This fear had developed over his time in political office because he had taken part in and 
witnessed many issues develop from this lack of centralization. He began his role in 
politics before the First World War, attempting amelioration between the British and 
German naval rivalry in 1913.1 In 1914 he was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty 
with duties that included the air defense of London and the protection of the Royal Navy 
and merchant shipping from German naval attack. In 1917 he was put in charge of the 
munitions production in Britain, which during this time was of great importance because 
supplies were low and strained. As his popularity began to grow he was designated as the 
diplomatic leader to devise a planned system of demobilization in order to calm and 
appease the tensions o f the unsatisfied soldiers returning from the war.2
1 Martin Gilbert. Winston Churhill's War Leadership (New York:Vintage Books 2003) 4
2 IBID
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These experiences helped Churchill develop a better understanding of politics and 
the inter-working o f military defense strategy, all o f which he later drew upon when he 
was reappointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1939 and further still when elected Prime 
Minister in 1940. Many of his experiences helped him develop and establish one of his 
core ideas: that military intelligence needed a centralized person to which to report in 
order to better facilitate the actions necessary to quickly and efficiently protect British 
interests.
During the outbreak o f World War II, Winston Churchill was not the most 
popular man in the British political world. In fact he was alienated and ostracized by both 
his party and the labor movement after speaking out against the Munich Conference in 
September 1938 that gave the Sudetenland to Germany. He prophesized more doom and 
dismay to come.3 Yet despite this gloomy outlook on the present events, some of the 
most important assets Churchill possessed during the winter of 1938-39 were his unique 
isolationist stance and his obstinate opposition to appeasement4 It was because of this 
isolation that as the war progressed he was capable of speaking out and gaining public 
support. By May of 1939 a Gallop poll questioned the public asking “Are you in favour 
of Mr. Winston Churchill being invited to join the Cabinet?” 56% of those polled 
answered yes.5 He regained popularity slowly, beginning with the help of the “anti­
appeasement section of the press” and continuing this growth through his actions and 
through a round of speeches delivered when he was appointed First Lord of Admiralty. 
His actions were drastically different from those of Prime Minister Chamberlain, who 
often seemed ill at ease as a war minister. Churchill raised the morale of the people 
simply by possessing a beaming face and exuberant style while holding office.6
Churchill’s full recovery from political isolation and public support occurred after 
two speeches, the first of which was on Sept. 26,1939. While delivering a review of the 
war at sea, one member o f the House of Commons noted, “One could feel the spirits of 
the House rising with every word.” The second speech occurred as a broadcast on Oct 1, 
1939 on the state o f the war and the British war effort during which it was described as 
“even more prime ministerial performance.”7 These were key moments that instilled 
hope, revived spirits and allowed trust from the British people and from Parliament. The 
hope Churchill gave the people was not from the words he spoke but in the manner, 
intonation and grace with which he said them, for “The effect o f Winston’s speech was 
infinitely greater than could be derived from any reading of the text.”8 The effect of his 
speeches was to add to his continuous growth in popularity as well as to lead to a deeper 
respect and admiration by the British people.
Due to the increase in support for Churchill and the failing self-confidence of 
Chamberlain with the debacle at Norway, Churchill was elected the successor to 
Chamberlain as the British Prime Minister in May of 1940. Following his election to the 
premiership, Churchill set about evaluating all aspects of British foreign policy. He 
determined that Britain would not only remain in the war but would continue to take the
3 Paul Addison Churchill: The Unexpected Hero (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 150-151
4 IB ID ,152
s IB ID ,154
6 IBID, 156-157.
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offensive against Hitler wherever possible. It was Churchill’s own strength of conviction 
and determination to be victorious in the war that squelched any thought of peace through 
appeasement. Britain was now committed not only to fighting, but to winning World 
War II.9 He “had come to power to prosecute the war more forcefully,”10 and began 
doing so by creating new positions within the Executive Departments. His first action as 
Prime Minister created the position and title of Minister o f Defense, which he then 
appointed himself. By creating this position he effectively took the central control of the 
war away from the War Cabinet who had conducted the war efforts under Chamberlain. 
The reason behind this new position was that the war should be centralized, in fact “he 
followed the war on all fronts in great detail with the aid of a portable Map Room.” One 
of the main facets of this position was that Churchill now had the right both to summon 
the Chiefs of Staff and to give them instructions on the conduct o f war.11
Through this position the military secretariat of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee were incorporated into a small department under his direct control. The 
War Cabinet met almost daily and made all the fundamental decisions of the war with 
regard to Churchill’s opinion and wishes. His aide General Ismay and his two deputies, 
who had control of the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee, 
headed the Defense Office. It reported directly to him, something that had never been 
done before.12 Both committees were in charge of establishing the feasibility o f the plans 
submitted to them by both Churchill himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.13 By creating 
this office and applying his own experiences and understanding of how the war should be 
fought Churchill effectively changed the course of the British defense system. He had 
eliminated any internal fighting or conflicts by systematically taking full control so that 
by the middle of the war he no longer called meetings with the Defense Committee of the 
War Cabinet but instead ran the military aspect o f the war through his personal thoughts 
and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. As a wartime leader he was greatly respected but 
often ran his staff very hard.14
Churchill demanded as much from himself as he did from the staff with which he 
worked. He gave everything he had, and told the English people he had to offer “nothing 
but blood, toil, tears and sweat.” He sacrificed in order to keep the British morale alive 
and to fulfill his promise that “[w]e shall defend our island, whatever the cost may 
be.. .we shall never surrender.” In his attempts to keep the war effort contained and 
controlled directly he demanded up-to-the-minute updates from all fronts o f the war. 
During the height of the Battle o f Britain he lived in a bunker beneath the Cabinet office 
where he could be reached at all times and could also make radio broadcasts to the British 
citizens.15 He did not keep regular work hours because his work was everywhere. From 
his home and office every one of his advisors, secretaries and Generals could be sent for
5 John Charmley, Churchill The End of Glory A Political Biography.(New York: Harcourt Brace & 
Company, 1993), 400.
10 IBID, 398
11 Addison 174
12 Virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man (New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1953) 317
13 Addison, 174
14 IBID, 175
ls William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Churchill: Visions of Glory 1874-1932 (Boston: Little 
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at any time of the day or night in order to be dictated notes and orders. This was vastly 
different from Chamberlain who had conducted everything through the process of formal 
meetings and arranged times.16
For Churchill the work did not end and he constantly needed to be in the know 
and in the thick of whatever was going on. This often caused him to run out in between 
bombings during the Battle of Britain so that he could view the damage from a firsthand 
account. He would later assess it as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.17 After 
Churchill was given information he was often able to see the larger picture and theorize 
Hitler’s next move from a political and ideological aspect. This unique ability was 
derived from his many years of experience and his understanding of the German 
maneuvers during WWI. Due to this he often suggested plans that the British Intelligence 
community did not understand because they viewed Hitler’s strategy only from their own 
military viewpoints while failing to learn the lessons o f history. Churchill’s main 
conclusion, reached in a “lightening flash” of illumination, was that Hitler would 
probably attack the Soviet Union after defeating Great Britain or possibly even before. In 
May of 1941 he sent a letter of warning to Stalin but Stalin did not heed the warning. His 
foresight and intuitive analysis of Hitler’s intention to move East helped him have a 
better understanding of the influx o f the information filtering through London.18
Another essential aspect of Churchill as Prime Minister and Minster of Defense 
was that he recognized the desperate need for aide to Great Britain. Churchill was 
determined to stand his ground and never surrender, but he was also not above asking for 
help. He directed his pleas to President Roosevelt and the United States. Churchill was 
convinced even before his appointment as Prime Minister that if  Great Britain did not 
gain support from another country, the results could be devastating. Therefore Churchill’s 
other great act in the spring and summer of 1940 was to convince President Roosevelt 
that Great Britain was still willing and able to fight and therefore was worthy of their 
support.19 Knowing that U.S. support was essential to the survival Britain, both U.S. and 
British media sources began proliferating propaganda throughout the U.S. proclaiming 
Churchill as a national hero as soon as he was elected Prime Minister. This was designed 
to spark public support in favor of accepting a deal such as the Lend Lease Act, 
legislation that was proposed by Churchill in a letter to President Roosevelt. Churchill’s 
ability to produce a spirited and rising oration made his U.S. observers enthralled with his 
“extrovert style of leadership” and was a great asset in garnering Congressional support.20 
The Lend Lease Act was enacted by Congress in 1941.
After gathering support from the U.S., Churchill was equipped to devote the 
necessary time to promote and plan projects for British offensive landings on the beaches 
o f Norway, Sicily, Italy and North Africa. Churchill’s military approach was an almost 
entirely offensive strategy to thwart the enemy at any feasible location. He was not a 
calculated strategist; he often was caught closely examining one area and then soon 
fixating on another target. However, by being able to understand the method o f Hitler’s 
strategy and using his previous experience Churchill was capable o f turning the tide of
16 Addison, 183
11 Manchester, 7-8
18 Tuvia Ben-Moshi Churchill: Strategy and History (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992) 141-142
19 Addison, 178
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the war by means of “constant action as wide scale as possible so that the enemy would 
be made to continually ‘bleed and bum,’ a phrase he often used.”21
Churchill’s other great feat was putting aside political and personal dislikes in 
order to ally with the Soviet Union to form a tight, cohesive alliance with the goal of 
attacking Germany from all sides. He saw this as almost an act of treachery and would 
not have agreed except as acting Minister o f Defense the mere size o f the Soviet Union 
offered an unquestionable strategic advantage of sheer manpower against the Germans. It 
also showed the ability to support the Eastern Front, possibly allowing for the 
establishment o f democratic ideas at the war’s end. Thus, through the arguments and 
coercion o f President Roosevelt, Churchill agreed to ally Great Britain with the Soviet 
Union and participate in active talks with Stalin. This was essential to the war because it 
showed that Churchill, although gruff and stubborn, would and could do what he deemed 
necessary for the British success in the war effort.22
Winston Churchill as a Prime Minister effectively inspired and guided the British 
through the grimmest part o f the war while still giving them hope. As Minister of 
Defense he created a brand-new system in which the war would operate effectively under 
his direct control. He was making strategic military alliances in which he procured the 
necessary supplies and support to manage British survival. “As a war leader, he was head 
and shoulders above anyone the British or any other nation could produce. He was 
indispensable and completely irreplaceable.”23 Therefore it was Churchill and his 
political, ideological and military leadership combined with his previous experiences that 
sternly and miraculously led a fighting, hopeful Great Britain through June of 1940-1941; 
and ultimately to victory.
21 Addison, 182
22 Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War (London: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 139
23 Addison, 182
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